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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The basic definitions of sociology represent an inte-
gral part of the language which sociologists use. Timasheff
has stated that there are three conditions for adequate
definitions in the social sciences: a definition must allow
for easy identification, it must be couched in a logical
place in the conceptual scheme of the science, and it must
be commonly accepted. Of these three conditions the last
is least likely to be achieved in the social sciences.
Timasheff believes that: "The lack of agreement results in
numerous terminological controversies . . . ."-1- As for
sociology, Sorokin states that it has many definitions which
are vague notions. These definitions are "operational rites"
based upon "dogmatic assumptions," represented by concepts
imported from the natural sciences which lose their exact
meaning when thus imported. "Clear ideas are usually
expressed in a clear and intelligible language, while vague
notions are communicated in obtuse and foggy speech."
-
LN. S. Timasheff, "Definitions in the Social Sciences,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LIII (November, 194 7),
pp. 2"01- 202.
P. A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology
and Related Sciences "[Chicago: Henry Regery, 1956) , pp.
35, 22.
2Standardization of definitions, however, is the most power-
ful defense "against lingering elements of individualism,
subjectivism, and mysticism in a science."3
If it is possible, then, to make the language of socio-
logy more useful by re-examining the basic definitions of
the field, a most important question can be raised: What
definition is more basic to sociology than the definition
of sociology itself? This brings us to another question:
Is there agreement among sociologists as to what sociology
is? If there is not, then our most basic definition does
not meet the third criterion given by Timasheff for ade-
quate definitions in the social sciences. The lack of
investigations in this area is somewhat surprising. There
has been only one study, since the invention of the word
"sociology," on the various definitions of the term.4 In
sum, this study is undertaken due to this lack of studies
in this area and also because there is a need for a re-
examination of our basic definitions of which none is more
basic than the definition of sociology itself.
The Purpose of the Study
The specific purpose of this study is to examine
various definitions of sociology since the invention of
the term. From this examination, an attempt will be made
3L. L. Bernard, "Definition of a Definition," Social
Forces, Vol. XIX (May, 1941), p. 501.
4Paul Hanley Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology
A Metasociological Treatise (New York: Cooper Square Pub-
lishers, Incorporated, 1965), pp. 129-148.
3to determine the extent of agreement among sociologists as
to what sociology means.
The Procedure
Chapter II, Part A, is concerned with the early Euro-
pean conceptions of sociology, from Comte through Pareto.
The extent of agreement among these conceptions is examined.
Part B is concerned with the extent of agreement of the
early American Conceptions of sociology. Part C examines
definitions found in Introductory texts from 1921 through
1950. The three sections of Chapter II may be considered
as a review of the literature if one views this paper in
the traditional thesis - framework.
Chapter III is concerned specifically with introductory
sociology texts and the extent of agreement among defini-
tions found in a sample of the current texts (1951-1970).
The importance of introductory texts in examining current
definitions of sociology is explained in Chapter III along
with the specific rationales for the years chosen and the
sample which is used.
In Chapter IV, a comparison will be made between
Furfey's study and Chapter III of the present investigation
to see if there is some continuity between the two and if
not the reasons for ^ e lack of it. In this chapter further
evidence will be presented concerning the extent of agree-
ment among sociologists on the definitions of the term
during the periods studied.
4Chapter V will discuss briefly the extent of agreement
and continuity of the definitions from Comte to the present.
Any conclusions concerning the extent of agreement will be
made at this time. It should be noted that this investiga-
tion is not an attempt to formulate a final definition of
sociology.
CHAPTER II
EARLY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEFINITIONS
In an attempt to determine the extent of agreement of
the conceptions of sociology up to 1951, this chapter is
divided into three parts: Part A surveys the early European
conceptions of sociology from Comte through Pareto; Part B
is concerned with the conceptions of the early American
sociologists; and Part C is a summary of definitions found
in introductory texts from 1921 through 1950.
Part A: Early
European Conceptions of Sociology
Conception One: Comte
The term sociology was first used by August Comte, who
felt that social phenomena are governed by laws. In
Comte's words,
The office of science is, not to govern, but to
modify phenomena; and to do this, it is necessary
to understand their laws . . . . Thus, then, we
see what is the function of social science. With-
out extolling or condemning political facts,
science regards them as subjects of observation: it
contemplates each phenomena in its harmony with
co-existing phenomena, and in its connection
with the foregoing and the following state of
1Ibn Khaldun saw a need for laws of social phenomena
in the fourteenth century. See Charles Issawi, An Arab
Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of
rbirTTTal dun ot Tunis', lT32-140"6 (London: John Murray,
1950), pp. 7, 8, 36"
both noin? P ? e n t ; ±Z e n d e a v o ^ to discover, from
Q
 o £ vie
*> the general relations which
connect all social phenomena; and each of them is
w h e n ^ h ' XK t h S s c i e n t i ^ c sense of the word,
*hen it has been connected with the whole of the
preceding movement.2
Comte sees the law of human progress as the motivating force
in social evolution. This law contains three stages of
human evolution: the Theological state, the Metaphysical
state, and the Positive state when "the mind has given over
the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and des-
tination of t.ie universe, and the causes of phenomena, and
applies itself to the study of their laws."3 The human
evolution procedes in the following manner:
We see that our social evolution is only the
final term of a progression which has continued
from the simplest vegetables and most insignifi-
cant animals, up through the higher reptiles,
to the birds and the mammifers, and still on to
the carnivorous animals and monkeys, the organic
characteristics retiring, and the animal pre-
vailing more and more, till the intellectual and
moral tend towards the ascendency which can never
be fully obtained, even in the highest state of
human perfection that we can conceive of.4
Comte believes that sociology is the last of the sciences.^
"The order that results is this: an order which of all
possible arrangements is the only one that accords with the
2August Comte, The Positive Philosophy of August Comte,
freely trans, and ed. by Harriet Martineau (3 vols.; London:
George Bell and Sons, 1896), Vol. II, p. 240.
3Ibid., Vol. I, p. 1, 2, 3.
4Ibid., Vol. II, p. 299.
5p# s# Marvin, Comte: The Founder of Sociology (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1965), p. 88.
7natural manifestation of all phenomena. Mathematics,
Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, Social Physics."6
Comte views social physics (sociology, la ter in his work)
as the "study of social phenomena" and " . . . the same
character of posi t ivi ty which is impressed upon al l the
others will be shown to belong to t h i s . " 7 He divides socio-
logy into social s ta t ics and social dynamics, and defines
them in the following manner.
In short, social dynamics studies the laws of
succession, while social s ta t ics inquires into
those of coexistence; so that the use of the
f i r s t is to furnish the true theory of progress
to po l i t i ca l practice, while the second performs
the same service in regard to order,, and this
su i t ab i l i ty to the needs of modern society is a
strong confirmation of the philosophical-
character of such a combination.^
Comte views the methods of a l l of the positive sciences as
identical to those used by sociology. "There are three
methods of proceeding: -by Observation, Experiment, and
Comparison."9 As with the Positive Philosophy, these
methods regard " . . . a l l phenomena as subjected to invar-
iable natural Laws. Our business is . . . to pursue an
accurate discovery of these Laws, with a view to reducing
them to the smallest possible number."10 Finally, Comte
6jvlartineau, The Positive Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 35.
7 Ib id . , Vol. I, p. 8.
8 Ib id . , Vol. I I , p. 228.
9 Ib id . , Vol. I I , p. 241.
1 0 Ib id . , Vol. 1, p. 5.
insists that sociology take a holistic view of social
phenomena: "It is no easy matter to study social phenomena
m the only right way,--viewing each element in the light
of the whole system."1"1-
To this author, the fact that Comte feels there is a
natural law of mankind that is directed toward the positive
state makes his conception one which is based upon an
unvalidated assumption. He believes that something will
cause this law to happen. This assumption is founded in
a supra-empirical realm rather than a scientific (empirical)
one. It demands a belief in the supra-empirical force which
drives the social evolution toward the positive state. He
presents no evidence that such a force exists. This assump-
tion might be explained by the philosophical training he re-
ceived. Durkheim says:
In one sense, all the fundamental ideas of Comtean
sociology can be found in Saint-Simon; Comte took
them from his master. But he did not limit him-
self to insisting that they could serve as a basis
of a new science; he undertook to create this
science.
Comte was not, however, the only sociologist with such a
conception. Herbert Spencer's definition of sociology is
nibid., Vol. II, p. 225.
12[Emile Durkhe^mi,- Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917: A Col
lection of Essays, trans."and ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus
Ohio State University Press, 1960), p. 377. The reader
should be aware of Durkheim's attempt to establish his own
view of sociology. Hence, he may be overly critical of both
Comte and Spencer.
^L t ^ s t udy of evolution in i ts most com-
plex form . .
 U s i n g t h e a n a l supplied
u> human l i fe , we saw that just as bodily develop-
ment and structure and function, furnish subject-
matter for biological sciences . . . s o , growth
and the rise of structures and functions accompa-
nying i t , furnish subject-matter for a Science of
Society. . . i t [sociology] has to explain
ho*, slight modifications of individual nature,
arising under modified conditions of l i fe , make
somewhat larger aggregates possible. It has to
trace out, m aggregates of some size, the genesis
of the social relations, regulative and operative,
into which the members fal l . It has to exhibit
the stronger and more prolonged social influences
which, by further modifying the characters of the
units , faci l i tate further aggregation with conse-
quent further complexity of social structure . . . .
In every case i t has for i ts subject-matter the
growth, development, structure, and functions of
the social aggregate as brought about by the.
mutual actions of individuals.13
According to Rumney, "Sociology was to Spencer a generalizing
science, concerned not with a particular society, but with
al l societies, and seeking to discover the laws of their
growth and development."14 Spencer's conception of socio-
logy* therefore, is an extension of Comte's conception.15
Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 350-5S1,
47.
-^Jay Rumney, Herbert Spencer's Sociology (New York:
Atherton Press, 1966), p. 23.
See Werner Stark, "Herbert Spencer's Three Sociolo-
gies," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXVI (August, 1961),
pp. 515, 517, 519. Stark says that Spencer defines socio-
logy in other ways. Sometimes he defines i t as the study
of individuals in conflict with the state. S t i l l , at other
times, he sees sociology as the study of the principles of
psychology: "A sociology neither organismic nor contrac-
tual , but cultural; a sociology very different from the
two others, because i t makes the sociality of man the pro-
duct of human forces." Given the diversity of Spencer's
definitions, for the purposes of this paper, only the defi-
nition presented in the text will be discussed because this
author views the other two definitions as contained within
this definition.
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First, Spencer and Comte both state that sociology should
rely upon the methods of the natural sciences. Second,
both share a belief in a fundamental law of social pheno-
mena and call this law evolution. Third, the generalizing
nature of both is an identical holistic view of social
phenomena. Durkheim points out this extension in the
following statement:
Comte's endeavor had been resumed in England
by Herbert Spencer. In order to confirm the
hypothesis that societies are natural phenomena,
as Comte had held, Spencer undertook to demon-
strate that the laws according to which social
institutions evolve are only special forms of
the more general laws that govern cosmic evolu-
tion.15
In conclusion, these two scholars present one concep-
tion of sociology: the science which uses the methods of
the natural sciences in the holistic study of the funda-
mental laws of social evolution.
Conception II: Durkheim
Conception I soon came under attack by Durkheim.
Durkheim states that Comte and Spencer had only spoken in
"philosophical generalities." To Durkheim, Comte's supreme
law is unrealistic, and Spencer's social realm is no more
than an extension of the biological realm.17
Durkheim seeks to limit the scope of sociology so that
it can be contained • xthin certain boundaries. He sees the
lack of boundaries as a threat to the scientific advancement
1 6
 [Durkheim] , Entile Durkheim, p. 379.
17Ibid., pp. 578, 379.
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of sociology. Durkheim feels that the task of sociology is
the description of the form and content of groups. Groups
are the subject matter of sociology because all social life
takes place within them. Society and groups must be under-
stood to have a nature of their own. Social phenomena are
different from phenomena of an individual nature. The
group is, itself, a specific subject matter that must be
studied at its own level of abstraction.18 Durkheim is
certain that society and group factors can not be reduced
to individual factors.
This sophism says that society is formed only of
individuals, and that, since the whole can only
contain what is found in the parts, all that is
social can be reduced to individual factors . . . .
When elements combine, a new reality derives from
their combination which has entirely new charac-
teristics; characteristics that are sometimes even
opposed to those observable in the component ele-
ments -19
Durkheim conceives sociology as divided into two distinct
branches. The first of these is "social morphology." The
subject-matter of which is the form of the group, which is
external and visible to all. This is the structure of
society. Upon observing this .structure, the social mor-
phologist then describes it. The second branch of sociology
is "social physiology." The social pressure one finds
within the group is '"'.used by social facts or ideas, which,
18Ibid., pp. 360-365.
19Ibid., PP. 363-364.
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if studied, reveal the causes of group behavior.20 Socio-
logy considers all of these factors and determines the laws
by which they operate. By doing this the causes (social
facts) and effects (social forms) of social life can be
explained. The methods of natural science must not be used
in their original form, but must be suited specifically to
the sociological task.2 1 Finally, Durkheim not only sees
a need for social morphology, social physiology, and other
special social sciences, but, in addition, he thinks that
general sociology is necessary. General sociology will, in
the future, unite all of these specialties into a uniform
2 2body of knowledge.
This second conception of sociology, in contrast to
the f i r s t , places the group in the forefront of sociological
subject-matter. Durkheim makes no assumptions about a
certain law being evident, but states that there are laws
and sociologists should find what they are through methods
suited for sociology. However, he agrees with Comte in
his division of sociology into two distinct branches. The
"social s ta t ics" can be closely allied with "social morpho-
logy," and "social physiology" is similar to "social dyna-
mics." This conception has two distinctive elements. The
f i rs t element, the reliance upon the group as the essence
of social phenomena, opposed to Spencer's concern with the
20ibid., pp. 361, 367, 368.
21ibid., pp. 369, 370.
22ibid., p. 370.
15
"social aggregate, as brought about by the mutual actions
of individuals."23 The individual is not the ultimate
reality he was thought to be, but is influenced and shaped
by a higher reality--the group. The group, as seen by
Durkheim, is something of and by itself, sometimes even
contrary to the wishes of individuals, within the group.
This view of the group is used to give sociology a distinct
subject matter; but it shifts the focus of sociology to a
different level of abstraction as well. The second distinc-
tive element, the specific focus on the forms of group
phenomena, is not antithetical to the first conception, and
might be considered a refinement of "social statics." How-
ever, the method that it implies makes it distinctive.
It might seem that Durkheim is wholly concerned with
forms. We must not, however, overlook his heavy reliance
upon causes (social facts) as objects of study, and the
proposal that these two should be put into a uniform body
of knowledge. As he presents his case, it is evident that
forms are only keys to unlock social phenomena,' not ends
in themselves. Durkheim, in summary, sees sociology as the
science of the forms and contents of groups and society.
Conception III: Simmel and Tonnies
Georg Simmel sees sociology as being composed of
three distinct branches: General Sociology, Pure or Formal
23Spencer, The Study of Sociology, p. 47.
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Sociology, and Philosophical Sociology.24 General Socio-
logy is the sociological investigation of historical facts:
". . . the whole of historical life insofar as it is formed
societally."25 Formal or Pure Sociology is viewed in the
following manner:
. . . [I]f society is conceived as interaction
among individuals, the description of the forms
of this interaction is the task of the science of
society in its strictest and most essential sense
. . . "pure sociology" . . . abstracts the mere
element of sociation . . . . [S]ocial groups
which are the most diverse imaginable in purpose
and general significance, may nevertheless show
identical forms of behavior toward one another
on the part of their individual members.
Simmel studies the form, which is determined by the content.
This differentiates sociology from the other social
sciences. Philosophical Sociology is the philosophy of
sociology and it is divided into the epistemology and the
metaphysics of sociology. This branch is essential to any
science because of the need for each science to examine
itself.27 General Sociology and Pure Sociology investigate
the forms of society which Simmel justifies by the assertion
that society is an abstraction. In studying this abstraction,
24[Georg Simmel], The Sociology of Georg Simmel,
trans, and ed. by Kurt Wolff LHew York: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1950) , pp. 16-23.
2SVojA., PP- 16-22.
26Ibid., pp. 21, 22.
27Ibid., pp. 23.
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the sociO lO g i s t sees the -totality of social life" which is
and has been transmitted throughout the life of man.
Therefore, the special science of sociology views the whole
of society as no other science can.28 ... . .
 [ T ] h e i n t £ r .
actions we have in mind when we talk about 'society' are
crystallized as definable, consistent, structures such as
the state and the family."29
Simmel's conception has three distinctive elements that
differentiate i t from the other two conceptions. First, he
sees sociology as having three distinct branches which are
different from the "social statics" and "social dynamics"
of Comte or "social morphology" and "social physiology" of
Durkheim. He also adds one branch which was not mentioned
before, a branch analogous to the meta-sociology of today 30
Second, he is concerned primarily with the pure forms
of society and not the content. Some might assume that
his conception is similar to Durkheim's in this respect,
but this would be an erroneous assumption. Whereas Durkheim
sees forms as only keys to the causes of social phenomena,
Simmel sees them as ends in themselves. In Simmel's words:
It [sociology] isolates i t [sociation] inductively
and psychologically from the heterogeneity of i ts
contents and purposes, which, in themselves, are
2 8Ibid. , p. 21.
29ibid., p. 9.
For information on Meta-sociology see: Paul Hanley
Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology (New York:
Cooper Square, 1965), pp. 1-52.
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not societal. It thus proceeds like grammar,
which isolates the pure forms of language from
their contents through \:iiich these forms, never-
theless, come to life . . . . [N]ot only may
the form in which the most emergent contents
are realized be identical; but, inversely, the
content, too, may persist , while i ts medium--
the interactions of the individuals--adopts a
variety of forms. We see, then, that the
analysis in terms of form and content trans-
forms the facts--which, in their immediacy,
present these two categories as the indissol-
uble unity of social l ife--in such a way as to
justify the sociological problem.31
Durkheim disagreed so strongly with Simmel's reliance upon
forms that he wrote this statement:
It seems that in this fashion, sociology is
furnished with a clearly defined subject-
matter. We think, however, that in reality
such a conception serves merely to keep i t
tied to metaphysical ideology when i t
actually shows an irresis t ible need to
emancipate i tself from this sphere. We do
not contest the right of sociology to con-
s t i tu te i tself by means of abstractions
because there is no science that could be
established otherwise. The abstractions
must be methodically disciplined, however,
and must separate the facts according to
their natural distinctions; otherwise, they
are bound to degenerate into fantastic
constructions and vain mythology.32
He went on to cri t icize Simmel for doing no more than using
new terminology in order to define sociology, instead of
using substantive material to accomplish this task.3 3
Third, Simmel's conception of sociology is distinct from
the others because of his concern with society as
31[Simmel], Simmel, pp. 22, 23.
32[DurkheimJ, Durkheim, p. 35 6.
3 3 ib id . , p. 370.
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asindividuals in interaction, not as a specific entity
Durkhcim envisioned i t . This differentiates Simmel's
definition from Durkheim's on another fundamental point.
It must be noted that Ferdinand Tonnies' conception
is similar to Simmel's, therefore, i t will be only briefly
mentioned. To Tonnies, sociology is the study of the forms
of social l i f e . He attempts to show that the phenomena
which draw men together and keep them together are found
in these forms.34 "Sociology as a special science has
as i t s subject the ' things' which result from social l i f e . "
These things are "products of human thinking and exist
only for such thinking." These social entities or forms
are rea l i t ies in themselves.35 As with Simmel, forms are
important, however, a differentiation between forms and
content is not mentioned by Tonnies. Also, as with Simmel,
society is not seen as different from the individuals that
make i t up.3 6
Conception IV: Max Weber
Max Weber presents the fourth conception of sociology.
Weber understands sociology as
. . . [T]hat science which aims at the interpre-
tive understanding of social behavior in order
to gain an explanation of i ts causes, i ts course,
•^Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society, (Gemein-
schaft und Gesellschaft), trans, and ed. by Charles P.
Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 237.
5 5 Ib id . , p. 246.
3 6 Ib id . , p. 250.
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and its effects. The subject matter of socio-
logy is "human behavior" only in so far as the
person or persons involved engage in some sub-
jectively meaningful action. °Such behavior
maybe mental or external; it may consist in
action or omission to act. The term social
behavior will be reserved for activities whose
intent is related by the individuals involved
to the conduct of others and is oriented
accordingly . . . "Meaning" is used here in
t\tfo different senses". First, there is actual
conduct by a specific actor in a given his-
torical situation or the rough approximation
based on a given quantity of cases involving
many actors; and, second, there is the con-
ceptually "ideal type" of subjective meaning
attributed to a hypothetical actor in a given
type of conduct. In neither sense can it be
used as an objectively "valid" or as a meta:
physically fathomable (true)- meaning. Herein
lies the distinction between the behavioral
sciences, such as Sociology and History and
the orthodox disciplines, such as Jurispru-
dence, Logic, Ethics, or Exthetics, whose
purpose it is to determine the "true" and
"valid" meaning of the objects of their
analysis.^'
According to Weber, the proof needed for the interpretation
of social behavior can be obtained by rational, i.e.,
logical, or mathematical means, or by emphatic means
("complete sympathetic emotional participation"). One
important rational method is the use of the ideal type.
The understanding of social behavior can be accomplished
either empirically or by "explanatory understanding." The
latter is the way by which the behavior is explained
through the observer's "grasp of the content of meaning
within which the actual course of action occurs." The
3 7Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans, and
introduction by H.'P. Secher (New^ork: Citadel Press,
1964), pp. 29, 30.
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sociologist, with this interpretive understanding, must
understand "concrete individual cases" of behavior, also
average or collective cases of behavior, and ideal types
of behavior.^8
When studying collectivities the sociologist should
not treat them as if they were a reality in themselves.
These collectivities are only the result of the behavior of
individuals, because only individuals can engage in meaning-
ful activities as representatives of the collectivities.
The holistic functional approach can be used to understand
the motivations of the behavior of individuals only as a
foundation because "Truly empirical sociological investiga-
tion begins only with the question, what did and still does
motivate the individual functionaries and members of the
community to" create and maintain the community.^ Weber
warns that the individualistic focus is not to be confused
with the science of psychology. He believes that it is a
mistake
. . . [T]o regard any kind of psychology as the
ultimate foundation of the sociological inter-
pretation of human behavior . . . because use of
psychological data must be distinguished from any
investigation of human behavior in terms of its
subjective meaning. Consequently, sociology does
not bear any closer logical relationship to psy-
chology than to any other science.4U
58ibid., pp. 31, 35, 36.
39ibid., pp. 42, 44, 49.
40ibid., pp. 50, 51.
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Any scientific laws which sociologists formulate can be no
more than generalizations with a high level of probability
if certain specific conditions are present. The under-
standing by the sociologist of the means and ends of the
behavior is responsible for this high level of probability.
However, man is not always rational, therefore, these
generalizations are not absolute.^1
The distinctive elements of Weber's sociology are its
assertion of interpretive understanding of the subjective
meaning of behavior, its individualistic focus, and its
ommittance of any assumptions about the existence of any
absolute laws of social behavior. None of the previous con-
ceptions of sociology mention the interpretive understanding
of the subjective meaning of behavior. Comte and Spencer
think that behavior is as objective as the physical ele-
ments with which the physical sciences deal and they do
not think that there should be more than an expansion of
physical science methods to include society. Durkheim pre-
sents a method suited to the study of social phenomena but
one which assumes that social facts exist. Simmel is con-
cerned with studying the pure forms of society. To achieve
such a conception, Weber seems to have different fundamental
assumptions about the nature of social reality. These
assumptions upon which the other conceptions are based
might be characterized as realistic and Weber's assumption
41lbid., pp- 50, 51.
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might be characterized as idealistic (in the metaphysical
sense). Another dichotomy might be objective and sub-
jective. Closely aligned with this element is the second
distinctive element of Weber's conception--its individual-
i s t ic focus. Whereas Comte and Spencer view society on a
holist ic level, Durkheim views the group and society as a
holist ic reality, and Simmel wishes to study society as made
up of individuals and to view i t from a holistic level,
Weber views a holistic functional approach only as a pre-
paratory step to the individualistic approach. The third
distinctive element is different from Comte and Spencer
because they base their conception of sociology on the
assumption that there is a fundamental law of evolution.
Without this law there can be no subject matter for socio-
logy. Durkheim makes no such assumption but does assume
that there are laws which sociology can discover. Simmel,
in discussing the stages of historical development and
elsewhere, assumes that there are some patterns that socio-
logists will find.42 Weber, however, sees no real need for
discovering certain specific laws of social behavior. He
seems to think that even if there were such laws, they
would be short-lived. Whereas Comte and Spencer are con-
cerned with predict^1! and control, Weber's main concern is
interpretive understanding.
42[SimmelJ, Simmel, p. 20.
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Cone: e p t i o n_Y: Pare to
The f i f t h concept ion of European sociology i s t h a t of
Vi I f r e do P a r e t o . To him
Human s o c i e t y i s the ob jec t of many s t u d i e s ,
borne of these are s p e c i a l i z e d ; for example, the
studies dealing with law, history, political
economy, religious history, and so forth,
lliere is also a group of studies .of society
which embraces categories which do not as yet
have a distinct form and which, in synthesis
with other studies which have already achieved
a defined form, are directed to the study of
human society in general. This group of
studies may be termed sociology.?3
Sociology's f i rs t task, then, is to classify theories or
propositions about human behavior. The "experimental
uniformities" which sociologists seek to establish are the
scientific laws of sociology. Therefore, there is no dif-
ference between the laws of sociology and "the laws of the
other sciences." Sociology is a logico-experimental science
not a dogmatic one because:
Up to the present time, sociology has almost
always been presented dogmatically. Let us not
be deceived by Comte's attaching the label
Positive to his philosophy. His sociology is
. . . dogmatic . . . They are different rel i -
gions, but religions they are s t i l l . The same
may be said of the works of Spencer.44
Pareto does not say whether the subject matter of
sociology is a society which is a reality in i tself or if
43Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological
Writings, trans, by Derick Mirbin~ selected by S. E~. Fimer
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 167.
44 Ibid., pp-. 168, 169, 171, 182.
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it is made up of individuals. Instead he is mainly con-
cerned with society in general terras and with all of the
existing social science knowledge. This position is indefi-
nite because it is saying that sociology will do whatever
the other sciences have not done. The generalizing nature
of sociology is first mentioned by Spencer and Comte, but
it is not the primary focus of their conception, as it is
with Pareto. Pareto does assume that there are certain
laws of human behavior and that it is sociology's task to
discover them. He does not, however, assume that there is
an evolutionary law. Although this conception is not
opposed to the others, it is distinct in that its primary
concern is with a synthesis of the existing theories about
human society from a generalizing perspective.
Conclusion: Part A
Table I presents briefly an evidence that the early
European conceptions of sociology are in a state of dis-
agreement, both as to the scientific nature of sociology45
and as to the subject matter of sociology. The youthful
nature of sociology might be one explanation for this dis-
agreement at this time.
45It might be noted that ail of the conceptions agree
on one fundamental point--sociology should be a science.
They all disagree, however, on the exact nature of this
science.
TABLE I
THE DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS OF
THE EARLY EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY
The Conception Distinctive Elements
T~~. The concern with the use
of natural science methods in
the study of social evolution
and a holistic view of the
social organism.
1. The reliance upon the
group and society as the es-
sence of social phenomena.
2. The focus on the form and
content of group phenomena.
~T~. The study of the pure
forms of interaction. 2. The
division of sociology is dif-
ferent from the divisions of
Conceptions I and II.
1. Individualistic focus on
meaningful social behavior. 2.
Use of explanatory understand-
ing as a method. 3. No assump-
tion about existence of social
behavior laws.
Synthesis and the general-
A. Conception One
(Comte and
Spencer)
•The scientific discovery and study
of the evolutionary laws of social
phenomena. Comte divides sociology
into social statics and social
dynamics .
B. Conception two
(Durkheim)
C. Conception Three
(Simmel and
Tonnies)
The scientific explanation of the
form and content of groups and
society. Division of sociology
into Social Morphology and Social
Physiology.
The scientific description of the
forms of interaction in society and
social life. It is divided into
General Sociology, Formal Sociology,
and Philosophical Sociology.
The science which aims at the inter-
pretive understanding of meaningful
social behavior.
D. Conception Four
(Weber)
E. Conception Five
(Pareto)
"TTfe synthesis of the general
theories of human society into a
scientific body of knowledge.
1.
izing nature of sociology is
the primary concern.
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Part B: Early American Conceptions
The purpose of this section is to see if the disagree-
ment found in the Early European conceptions of sociology
continued in the United States. Six early American concep-
tions are examined.
Conception I: Sumner, Ward, and Giddings
Three of the first American sociologists, William
Graham Sumner, Lester F. Ward, and Franklin Henry Giddings,
have similar conceptions which are considered an extension
of Conception I: Early European. Even though there are
minor differences among the three, these differences are
not extensive enough to warrant a distinct conception for
each.
William Graham Sumner defines sociology as follows:
Sociology is the science of life in society. It
investigates the forces which come into action
wherever a human society exists. It studies the
structure and functions of the organs of human
society, and its aim is to find out the laws in
subordination to which human society takes its
various forms and social institutions grow and
change. Its practical utility consists in
deriving the rules of right social living from
the facts and laws, which prevail by nature in the
constitution and functions of society.
Sumner then elaborates on his definition. Biology studies
the struggle for existence in which all biological beings
participate throughout their lives, whereas sociology
46[William Graham Sumner], Social Darwinism: Selected
Essays of William Graham Sumner, introduction by Stow
Persons (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1963), pp. 9, 10. Emphasis mine.
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studies this struggle for existence in human society. In
this manner sciences work together. The study of society-
extends from the family to the most complex form of social
organization. Two laws are specifically mentioned by Sumner
The law of population, which is a biological law that deter-
mines the multiplying of the species until the species is
in a state of need (because of overpopulationj and the law
of diminishing returns, which indicates that the more the
land is worked, the less the return comes from it. These
laws produce the struggle for existence. There are two
struggles apparent: the struggle of man against nature and
the struggle of man against man. It is the problem of
sociology to study this struggle and to find the right
policy for resolving it. Sociology is "in a tentative and
inchoate state. All that we can affirm is that social
phenomena are subject to law." Sociology then should dis-
cover the laws which control society as physics discovers
4 Pi
the laws that control the physical world. °
Ward conceives sociology as follows:
The conception of a universal causal dependence
of phenomena when transformed into an active
working principle, takes the shape of a universal
theory of development or evolution. The high
utilitarian motive, focalizing all considera-
tions in the good of man, can have no other
47Ibid., pp. 14-29.
48Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
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crf^r ^ T t o u e s t a b l ish as the ultimate
science,_for the perfection of which all
or nuuian
l o y ' 4 9 U i C n t a K e s t h e form and name socio-
Ward then elaborates on this definition. Dynamic sociology
must first educate the members of society with the existing
knowledge about society; and secondly, it must synthesize
the "true relations of dependence which exist among all
known truths." This makes sociology "The whole philosophy
of human progress."50 Dynamic sociology must redirect man
from his wasteful ways and use the existing natural forces
to achieve progress. The science of society can do this
with Comte's method, "Voir pour prevoir," "prevoyance,
d'ou action," which according to Ward means "Predict in
order to control, such is the logical history and process
of all science, and, if sociology is a science such must be
its destiny and function."51 Finally, as may be observed
from the above, Ward divides sociology into social statics
and social dynamics as Comte suggested. He feels that the
latter has been neglected and that it should be the major
c 2
emphasis of sociology.
49Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology (New York: D.
Appleton and Company, 1907, first copyright 1883), Vol. I.,
p. 9.
50Ibid., p. 25.
51Ibid., p. 81.
52Ibid., p. 700.
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Giddings defines sociology as ». . .an attempt to
account lor the origin, growth, structure, and activities of
society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical
causes, working together in a process of evolution."53 He
wants to apply the methods of natural science to the phenom-
ena of sociology. By viewing society from an holistic
perspective, sociology attempts to discover the natural
laws which govern it. This is an extension of the ideas
set forth first by Comte, then by Spencer. Durkheim and
Tarde attempted to demarcate the essential phenomena of
sociology. Giddings believes, however, that the essential
phenomena are best explained by the use of the "conscious-
ness of kind" (an awareness of others as like kind) as a
fundamental sociological concept. This consciousness is
in each individual's psyche. Both sociology and psycho-
logy study the psyche, but psychology studies the "associa-
tion of ideas" within the individual mind and sociology
studies the "association of these minds."
In summary, Sumner, Ward, and Giddings view evolution
as the guiding force behind human society. Sumner added
the Darwinian proposition of the struggle for existence to
the Comtean and Spencerian concept of social evolution.
Moreover, all three wish to extend the methods of natural
53Franklin Henry Giddings, The Principles of Sociology
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1908), p. 8.
54Ibid., pp. 1-17.
55Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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science to social phenomena, since natural phenomena and
social phenomena are both governed by the same laws.
Sumner and Ward are particularly concerned with the utility
of the science and all three see sociology as the ultimate
science. These proclamations seem to detract from the
credibility of this conception by placing sociology in the
position of being another philosophy of life. It is ironic
that this position is presented under the guise of the methods
of natural science. The holistic perspective of viewing
society as an organism is common to all three, as it is
common to Comte and Spencer. Finally, the distinction
between psychology and sociology is important to Giddings,
while Sumner and Ward do not emphasize it. This concern is
explained by Giddings in the following manner: "Believing
that sociology is a psychological science . . . I have
endeavored to direct attention chiefly to the psychic
aspects of social phenomena."
Conception II: Ross
According to Ross, sociology is the science of social
phenomena. Social phenomena cannot be explained without
taking into account the actions of "one human being on
another." Ross believes that sociologists should concen-
trate on social process as the cause of the effects that
s, The Principles of Sociology, p. 5.
57Edward Alsworth Ross, Foundations of Sociology (Lon-
don: MacMillan and Company, 1919), pp. 3-17.
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are of utmost importance in sociology. Hence, sociologists
must study groups and institutions.58 He regards sociology
as an essential social science.
The relation of the trunk of a tree to its
branches is, I believe a fit symbol of the
relation of sociology to the special social
sciences . . . . So far as social life is
one, there will be one master science of social
life.59
He also believes that sociology will benefit by using Comte's
divisions of social statics and social dynamics. The dyna-
mics should not be concerned with evolution, but change.
Ultimately, Ross feels that the sociologist must describe
and study the history of what is described, theorize, and
put all of these into specific policies which in turn can
be put to practical use.
Ross differs from Sumner, Ward, and Giddings^ as well
as from Comte and Spencer, in that he does not see evolu-
tion as the guiding force behind society. He specifically
states that there is no evolution, but change, that there
is no progress, but process. This is a modification of the
evolutionary view. However, Ross does not give up the
concern with change. This places Ross in a position to
study the same phenomena as Sumner, Ward, and Giddings,
but from a less philosophical perspective. By softening
58ibid., pp. 90-91.
59ibid., pp. 14-27.
60ibid., pp. 182-184, vii-ix.
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the evolutionary assumption, Ross makes sociology more
acceptable to the scholars of the twentieth century. More-
over, Ross joins with Ward, Sumner and Giddings in stressing
the utility of sociology.
Conception III: Cooley
Charles Horton Cooley's definition of sociology is
"first, last, and nearly all the time, a study of process."61
Cooley thinks there are two significant differences between
sociology and biology:
One is that in biology essential change in
types is chiefly slow and not easily percep-
tible. For the most part we have to deal with
a moving equilibrium of species and modes of
life repeating itself generation after genera-
tion . . . . In social life, on the other
hand, change is obvious and urgent; so that
the main practical object of our science is
to understand and control it. The dramatic
element, which in biology is revealed only to
a titanic imagination, becomes the most famil-
iar and intimate thing in experience . . . .
I should say that it [the fact that we know
our subject-matter by "sympathetic participa-
tion"] puts these studies [social sciences] in
a class by themselves: whether you call them
sciences or something else is of no great
importance. It is their unique privilege to
approach life from the point of view of a
conscious and familiar partaking of it.
This involves unique methods which must be
worked out independently. The sooner we
cease circumscribing and testing ourselves
by the canons of physical and physiological
science the better . . . . Exact prediction
and mechanical control for the social world I
believe to be a false ideal inconsiderately
borrowed from the provinces of physical science.
There is no real reason to think that this sort62
of prediction or control will ever be possible.
61Charles Horton Cooley, Social Process (Carbondale,
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966), p. 376.
62Ibid., pp. 396, 397, 398.
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Cooley proposes the "dramatic method" as a method for social
science :
We have seen that social intelligence . . . is
a dramatic vision by which we see how the
agents now operating must interact upon one
another and issue in a new situation. How
shall we apply this idea to social science?
Shall we say that that too is dramatic? . . .
All science may be said to work by a dramatic
method when it takes the results of minute
observation and tries to build them into fresh
wholes of knowledge . . . . The only instru-
ment that can in any degree meet the test of
prediction, where new problems of higher
choice confront the mind, is the instructed
imagination, which, by a kind of inspired
intelligence, may anticipate within itself
the drama of social process, and so foresee
the issue . . . . I think, then, that the
supreme aim of social science is to perceive
the drama of life more adequately than can be
done by ordinary observation . . . . [T]he
constructive part of science is, in truth, a
form of art."-5
Finally, Cooley thinks that sociology should be used for
social improvement:
The method of social improvement is likely to
remain experimental, but sociology is one of
the means by which the experimentation becomes
more intelligent . . . . By observation and
thought we work out generalizations which help
us to understand where we are and what is going
on. These are "principles of sociology."
The subject matter of Cooley's conception (social pro-
cess) is identical to that used by Ross. Cooley's concep-
tion is distinct, however, because of its use of the dra-
matic method as the dominant method of sociology rather
than the methods of the natural sciences. Sumner, Giddings,
63ibid., pp. 395, 400, 403.
64Ibid., pp. 402-403.
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and Ward wish to extend the methods of natural science to
social phenomena while Cooley wants to emphasize the drama-
tic method. Cooley regards sociology as an instrument for
social improvement rather than a philosophy of life, as
Simmer, Ward, and Giddings do. This view is, therefore, a
modification of the earlier philosophies of life.
Conception IV: Park and Burgess
Park and Burgess define sociology in this statement:
Sociology, so far as it can be regarded as a
fundamental science and not mere congeries of
social-welfare programs and practices, may be
described as the science of collective
behavior.65
In discussing the nature of sociology as a science, Park
and Burgess observe that Comte confuses the concept of
natural laws because:
. . . [I]n the field of the social sciences
the distinction between natural and moral law
has from the first been confused. Comte and
the social philosophers in France after the
Revolution set out with the deliberate purpose
of superseding legislative enactments by laws
of human nature, laws which were to be posi-
tive and "scientific." As a matter of fact,
sociology, in becoming positive, so far from
effacing, has rather emphasized the distinc-
tions that Comte sought to abolish.66
Park and Burgess believe that sociology was first, under
the influence of Comte and Spencer, a philosophy of history,
or a "'science' of progress." Next, different schools of
65Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, An Introduction
to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1921), p. 42.
66Ibid., p. 12.
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sociological thought v.ere "absorbed in an effort to define
sociology's point of view." The third period (beginning in
the 1920's) is one of investigation and research, a time
when facts are to be collected to validate theories.67
During this period, sociology will become an experimental
science and will begin to classify social problems, types,
organization, and structure of social groups, studying
social processes. Moreover, they indicate that before
sociological ideas can be used to solve social problems,
sociology is in need of "a more thoroughgoing study of the
problems, systematic social research, and an experimental
social science." In discussing the subject matter of
sociology, Park and Burgess state that there are two per-
spectives from which one may view society: the individual
and the collective, but sociology must primarily be con-
cerned with collective behavior or corporate action.
. . . [Sjociology, speaking strictly, is a
point of view and a method for investigating
the processes by which individuals are in-
ducted into and induced to co-operate in some
sort of permanent corporate existence which
we call society.
The way in which the group is a reality in itself by means
of like-mindedness is that there is "so much of a consensus
among the individuals of a group as will permit the group
to act."69
67Ibid., p. 44.
68Ibid., pp. 45-57.
69Ibid., pp. 41, 42.
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Park and Burgess1 conception has two distinctive ele-
ments: (1) an attempt to modify the earlier speculative
position regarding the natural laws of social phenomena, and
(2) an attempt to synthesize the two perspectives by which
different schools of sociology view society into one which
emphasizes the collective but takes into account the indivi-
dual. In the former distinctive element they differentiate
their conception from that of Comte and Spencer and that of
Sumner, Ward, and Giddings, in their views of natural laws.
They also differentiate it from Cooley and Ross' view that
sociology is used for social improvement. They say that
sociology must first formulate its own theories before
attempting to solve social problems. They see the period
of experimentation as the beginning. Here, again, sociology
is presented as a pure science. In the latter distinctive
element, Park and Burgess are attempting to solve the dis-
agreement over the subject matter of sociology that existed
in the early European conceptions. Park and Burgess wish to
synthesize the opposing views of Durkheim and Simmel and the
others into a more solid approach to the subject matter with
which sociology must deal.
Conception V: Sorokin.
When, in 1931, Pitirim A. Sorokin was confronted with
a multitude of definitions of sociology, he criticized these
definitions. Sorokin writes that defining sociology as the
science of culture is hardly a definition because culture is
a loose term as it is studied by the special social sciences;
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and if it is defined in this way, it does not give sociology
a distinct subject matter. If it is defined as the science
of MhumM_^eJ:_ati_ons_sM or "social interaction," or "social
forms_," or "group interpretation.." or as "the science of
society," it lacks precision because all of these defini-
tions do not again differentiate sociology from the other
social sciences. All social sciences study society, groups,
and social relations and human relations in specific ways.
Sociology must have a distinct focus which differentiates
it from all of these.70
Sorokin defines sociology as follows: "Sociology is
a generalizing science of socio-cultural phenomena viewed
in their generic forms, types, and manifold interconnec-
tions." In substantiating this definition, he says that
the other social sciences have their own special compart-
ments, hence, they are special sciences. On the other
hand, sociology looks at all social phenomena from a general
izing perspective which is unique to social science.
Without sociology, these other sciences are limited in
their scope. Instead of looking for the uniqueness of
events, sociology looks for common characteristics. Socio-
7 2logy studies the whole of social phenomena. He says that:
7 0P. A. Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," Social
Forces, Vol.* X (October, 1931), pp. 21, 22.
71p A # sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (New
York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1962), p. 16.
72Ibid., pp. 6-17.
It [sociology] has been a generalizing disci
pline in the conceptions of all great socio-
logists from Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Ibn
Khaldun and Vico to August Comte, Herbert
Spencer, Tarde, Durkheim, and Pareto . . . . / 3
In his Contemporary Sociological Theories, Sorokin also
emphasizes that
Sociology has been, is, and either will be a
science of the general characteristics of all
classes of social phenomena, with the rela-
tionships and correlations between them; or
there will be no sociology. ^
As Sorokin himself admits, his definition expands a
fundamental focus of Pareto, Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim.
He makes no assumptions about evolution or groups, rather
he assumes that sociology finds its uniqueness among the
social sciences by being a general science. This is simi
lar to Conception V: Early European. Pareto and Sorokin
are concerned with the study of human society in general
whereas Pareto regards this science as not yet having a
distinct form. Sorokin is concerned with "socio-cultural
phenomena in their generic forms, types, and manifold
interconnections." In expanding and modifying Pareto,
Sorokin presents a more specific and sophisticated defini
tion than Pareto (especially if the explanations of each
one are compared.) Sorokin, however, warns that
73Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," p. 23.
74p A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories
(New York: 'Harper and Brothers, 1928), p. 761.
Many people mix the above concept of general
sociology with a vague synthetic philosophy zing.
Iney think that such a concept of sociology
does not make out of it a special science/ but
makes a kind of "synthetic hodge-podge" or
encyclopedia of all social sciences. I em-
phatically stress that such a conclusion is
utterly wrong./b
Sbrokin's conception differs from that of Sumner, Ward,
and Giddings, and also Ross and Cooley, in that it is not
concerned with policy, but with generalizing about socio-
cultural phenomena. This is similar to Park and Burgess
and again presents sociology as a pure science.
However, Sorokin's conception is not seen as final.
Stuart A. Rice, in answer to Sorokin, agrees with Sorokin's
two types of sociology: a generalizing social science and
the splecial areas included within it. Rice suggests, how-
ever,- that there be a third distinct type of sociology that
is- concerned with "embryonic" studies of social phenomena
with the other social sciences. This, of course, is not
a disagreement over the basic conception of sociology, but
is only an expansion of Sorokin's conception. Furthermore,
Rice believes in still another type of sociology:
.. .. .. [TJhere is a fourth type of sociologies
consisting of ethical valuations, which are not
really science or philosophy, and which are ul-
timately beyond the reach of science. To these
the scientific sociologist offers no objection so
loner as they are presented as ethical ideals.
Spiritual beliefs, or artistic preferences."
75sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," p. 24.
76stuart A- R i c e' '?what i s Sociology?", Social Forces,
Vol. X (October, 1951), p. 321.
77Ibid., pp. 325, 326.
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Here, Rice seems to be speaking of the conception of socio-
logy held by Sumner, Ward, and Giddings. He is willing to
accept this type of sociology if it does not claim to be a
science.
In a rejoinder to Rice's article, Sorokin states that
he is speaking of a distinct subject' matter which is not as
vague as Rice implies that it is in his. article. He also
attempts to solve the problem of the fourth type of socio-
logy mentioned by Rice:
. . . [TJhere is no conflict between sociology
and ethics, if it is recognized that ethical or
practical sociology is an applied art, whose
main objective may be outside of sociology, but
in reaching whose postulated goal the use of
scientific formula and data may help.™
Conception VI: Abel
So far, then, Rice has presented no opposition to
Sorokin's conception. In 1932, however, there was opposi-
tion to such a conception from Theodore Abel. First, Abel
disagrees with the conception of sociology as a general
science. He does not think that sociology can study
society in general because of the ambiguity of the term
and the problems involved in making generalizations about
such an abstract phenomenon. He sees any attempt at such
a task as merely philosophic speculation. He does not think
that it can be a general science in a synthetic manner
either, because of the impossibility of such a task, and the
78P A Sorokin, "Rejoinder Notes on 'What is Socio-
logy?' ,"'§ocial_Forces, Vol. X (October, 1931), p. 326.
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fact that sociology would not then have a distinct subject
matter, or because it would then become nothing more than
social philosophy. He contends that such a general science
already exists in the form of psychology. This, then, is
justification enough for doing away with such a position
since it only serves a duplicate function.
Second, Abel points out that there is no precise
definition of what Sorokin calls the common characteristics
of social phenomena. Every social science is individual-
izing as well as generalizing. Finally, he asks, why is
the study of such phenomena needed when psychologists,
economists, and historians constantly account for them?
Abel then states that to conceive sociology with a distinct
subject matter is the only \:ay to make it a distinct social
science. Sociology's distinct subject matter can be found
in those "resultants" of human behavior which are the con-
sequence of individuals' adjustment to living together.
Abel describes these phenomena as follows:
The object-matter of sociology is social posi-
tions, relationships, and groups, and its pur-
pose is to arrive at a systematic body of demon-
strable propositions about them by means of for-
mal and historical analysis.
Abel then stresses the need for a study of the forms of
80
these phenomena, both in the present and in the past.
79Theodore Abel, "The Nature and Scope of Sociology,"
Social Forces, Vol. XI (December, 1932), pp. 177, 178,
80Ibid., pp. 179, 180, 181, 182.
41
Abel's conception, however, is by no means new. In stressing
the special nature of sociology, he is actually agreeing
with Sorokin who stated that the generalizing nature of
sociology made it a special social science with a distinct
subject matter. Again in Abel's conception, we find the
European influence and also a stress' on sociology as a pure
science and not a philosophy of life. Moreover, there is
a replacement of the methods of the natural sciences as
used by Sumner, Ward, and Giddings with formal and histori-
cal methods. However, Abel uses Simmel's formalistic con-
ception even to the extent of placing historical sociology
(or General Sociology to Simmel) in a position of impor-
tance. Abel does not mention Simmel's formulation, and
attempts to leave us with the impression, that this is a
unique conception, when, in fact, it is not. Positions,
relationships, and groups studied historically and formalis-
tically mean the same as a "description of the forms of . . .
interaction."
Conclusion: Part B
The findings indicate that disagreement exists among
the early American conceptions of sociology (see Table II).
Specifically, the conceptions disagree on the subject matter
of sociology. Cor option I is concerned with evolution
while Conceptions II and III modify this to social process.
This author proposes that these two types of subject matter
are enveloped under the general subject matter: social
change. The social processes, which are studied as
TABLE II
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS:
EARLY AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY
The Conception Distinctive Elements
IT. Natural science methods
used. 2. Sociology is an ap-
plied science. 3. Sociology is
the ultimate science. 4. Evo-
lution is the guiding force
behind society.
~T~! Sociology Is an applied
science. 2. Sociology is the
ultimate science. 3. The social
processes of social phenomena
are the subject matter of
sociology.
Conception One
(Sumner, Ward,
and Giddings)
Sociology is the scientific study of
the evolution of social phenomena
using the methods of the natural
sciences for the betterment of mankind,
"Sociology is the scientific study of
the processes of social phenomena for
the betterment of mankind.
Conception Two
(Ross)
Conception Three
(Cooley)
Sociology is the science of the social
processes of society which emphasizes
the use of the dramatic method and is
concerned with social improvement.
Conception Four
(Park and
Burgess)
Sociology is the science of collec-
tive behavior concerned with experi-
mental research directed toward
clarifying its fundamental ideas.
1.Sociology's concern with
social improvement. 2. The
dramatic method. 3. The sub-
ject matter is social process-
es .
Sociology
 i a pure science.
2. Experimental method. 3.
Draws distinction between natu-
ral and moral laws. 4. Attempts
to synthesize the individualis-
tic and collectivistic views
of society into an approach
emphasizing the collective and
using the individual.
(continued on page 43)
TABLE II (continued)
AN ILLUSTRATION OF TIl.ti DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS
EARLY AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY
Conception Five
(Sorokin)
The Conception Distinctive Elements
"Sociology is a generalizing science
of socio-cultural phenomena viewed
in their generic forms, types, and
manifold interconnections."
1. Sociology is a pure science
2. Sociology must be a general'
izing science. 3. The subject
matter is socio-cultural
phenomena.
Conception Six
(Abel)
Sociology is a special social science
concerned with the formal and his-
torical analysis of social positions,
relationships, and groups with the
purpose of developing a "systematic
body of demonstrable propositions"
about them.
1. Sociology is a pure science.
2. Sociology's method is for-
mal and historical analysis.
3. It is a special rather than
a general science. 4. The sub-
ject matter is the history and
form of social positions,
relationships, and groups.
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changing and dynamic aspects of society, and evolution,
which is studied as an ongoing process, are simultaneously
concerned with social change, with a difference in the fund-
amental assumptions underlying each. Thus far, this is the
first time there has been such an agreement. Conceptions
V and VI disagree on the subject matter of sociology. Both
also disagree with Conceptions I, II, and III. Conception
IV is an attempt to synthesize the individualistic and
collectivistic views of society, which makes it distinct
from the other conceptions.
Part C: Definitions in
Introductory Texts 1921 through 1950
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to deter-
mine the extent of agreement found in the definitions of
sociology in introductory textbooks from 1921 through 1950.
It is felt that introductory sociology texts are most con-
cerned with defining the field. The books are considered
introductory texts if the authors state thusly either in
the titles or the prefaces. The years 1921 through 1950
were chosen because this period immediately precedes the
study contained in Chapter III and should serve as a source
for comparison used here. The books used in this section
are all that this author could find in the Western Kentucky
University Library and the Vanderbilt University Library.
81Twenty-three introductory textbooks are used in this summary.
81The twenty-three, books used are:
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(continued) L. L. Bernard, An Introduction to Socio-
lpgy C N e w York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942).
Rudolph M. Binder, Principles of Sociology (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1928).
Lewis A. Boettiger, Fundamentals of Sociology (New
York: Ronald Press, Co., 1938).
L. J. Carr, Situational Analysis (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1948).
Clarence Marsh Case, Outlines of Introductory Sociology
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 19 24).
Charles Horton Cooley, deceased, Robert Cooley Angell,
and Lowell J. Carr, Introductory Sociology (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933). This text was published
with Cooley as deceased, therefore, it is not seen as inter-
fering with his conception mentioned earlier.
Jerome Davis and Harry Elmer Barnes, An Introduction to
Sociology (New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1927).
Carl A. Dawson, An Introduction to Sociology (New York:
Ronald Press, Co., 1929).
H. G. Duncan, Backgrounds for Sociology (Boston: Mar-
shall Jones Co., 1931).
Henry Pratt Fairchild, General Sociology (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1934).
John Lewis Gillan and Frank W. Blackmar, Outlines of
Sociology (New York: MacMillan Co., 1930).
John Lewis Gillin and John Phillip Gillin, An Introduc-
tion to Sociology (New York: MacMillan Co., 1946).
Ernest R. Grooves and Harry Estill Moore, An Introduc-
tion to Sociology (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1940) .
Edward Cary Hayes, Introduction to the Study of Socio-
logy (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1925).
E. T. Hiller, Principles of Sociology (New York: Har-
per and Brothers, 1933).
Frederick E. Lumley, Principles of Sociology (New York:
McGraw-Hill Co., 1928).
Robert M. Maclver, Society: Its Structure and Change
(New York: Long and Smith, Inc., 1931)._
Raymond W. Murray, Introductory Sociology (New York:
F. S. Crofts and Co., 1935).
Howard W. Odum, Understanding Society (New York: Mac-
Millan Co. , 1947).
Elmer Pendell, Society Under Analysis: An Introduction
to Sociology (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Jaques Cattell Press,
294 2)
E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, Introduction to Sociology
(New York: McGraw-Hill Books Co., 1933).
Verne Wright and Manuel C. Elmer, General Sociology
(New York- Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1938).
Kimball Young, An Introductory Sociology (New York:
American Book Co., 1939).
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It is believed that the books are representative of the
introductory texts published during this time. Two aspects
of the definitions will be taken into consideration: their
view of the scientific nature of sociology, i.e., whether
or not it is a science, and their views of the subject
matter of sociology.
The Scientific Nature of Sociology
Twelve definitions (Wright and Elmer, Reuter and Hart,
Maclver, Murray, Hiller, Davis and Barnes, Cooley, Angell
and Carr, Duncan, Carr, Wilson and Kolb, Bernard, and
Boettiger) mention that sociology is a science in their
definitions. Nine (Young, Hayes, Graves and Moore, Fair-
child, Dawson, Case, Pendell, Gillin and Gillin, and Odum)
also mention study or scientific study. Three definitions
(Hayes, Bernard, and Binder) contain an applied function
for sociology within the definition.
Groups
Six definitions, (Murray, Hiller, Dawson, Davis and
Barnes, Pendell, and Carr) out of twenty-three examined,
contain a mention of social or human groups as the subject
matter of sociology. An example is: "the study of human
groups."82 However, three of the authors (Hiller, Dawson,
and Carr) are more extensive in their formulation of the
subject matter of sociology as groups. For example "the
compositions, forms, structure, functions and changes of
82Murray, Introductory, p. 3.
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human groups"" or "the study of the forms, mechanisms, and
processes of group behavior,"" are seen as the subject
matter.
Society
Four definitions (Odum, Case, Lumley, and Gillin and
Blackmar) are similar to the following: sociology is "the
systematic study of society."85 Two (Lumley and GilIan and
Blackmar) define the subject matter the same. Their concern
is with "the phenomena of society arising from the associa-
tion of mankind."86 One definition (Case) is more extensive
than the others: "the study of the associational forms,
rules, and institutions of society."87 Here again there is
variation within definitions. They see society as the sub-
ject matter but disagree as to the exact nature of this
subject matter.
Interaction
Three definitions (Boettiger, Duncan, and Gillin and
Gillin) of the twenty-three contain interaction as the sub-
ject matter of sociology. One (Gillin and Gillin) defines
it as: "the study of interaction arising from the association
8
^Carr, Situational Analysis, p. 2.
84Dawson, Introduction, pp. 823-824.
o r
° Odum, Understanding, p. 10.
, Principles, p. 540.
87Case, Outlines, p. xxii.
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of living b e i n g s . " 8 8 Another (Boettiger) is concerned with
the processes and structures: ". . . [T]he scientific study
of social processes and social structures from the point of
view of human interaction." 8 9 While the third (Duncan) is
more extensive: sociology is the ". . . [Scientific study
of the processes of interaction or persons, and the patterns
these form in relation to biological, psychological, and
Q n
cultural influences."
Man and His Human Environment
Two definitions (Fairchild and Binder) out of the
twenty-three are that sociology is the "study of man and
his human environment in their relations with each other."
Human Association
Two definitions (Groves and Moore, and Cooiey, Angeli
92
and Carr) place "human association" or "man in association
with his fellows"93 as the subject matter of sociology.
Social Relationships
Out of the twenty-three definitions, only one (Maclver)
states "that for us the subject-matter of sociology is
88Gillin and Gillin, Introduction, p. 3.
89Boettiger, Fundamentals, p. 21.
90Duncan, Ba ..grounds, p. 11.
91Fairchild, General, p. 90.
92Cooley, Angeli, and Carr, Introductory, p. 1
93Reuter and Hart, Introduction, p. 5.
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social relationships as such."94
Social Processes
Only one definition (Reuter and Hart) out of the twenty-
three mentions "the processes by means of which human nature
is formed and culture developed,"95 as the subject matter
of sociology.
Human Experience
One (Hayes) views human experience as the subject
matter of sociology and he also wishes to view human exper-
ience in an ethical, causal, synthetic, and non-prejudicial
manner.
Human Behavior in Social Situations
One (Bernard) indicates that sociology must
. . . [Ajssemble all available knowledge about
human behavior in social situations and reduce
it to general principles which can be used for
the explanation of adjustment problems and for
guidance in social control.-7
while one (Young) is concerned primarily with human
behavior.
Group, Culture, Personality, Social Organization,
Social Process, and Social Control
Finally, one definition (Wright and Elmer) is similar
to that formulated by a committee of the American
94MacIver, Society, p. 3.
95Reuter and Hart, Introduction, p. 5.
96Hayes, Introduction, p. 8.
97Bernard, Introduction, p. 8.
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Sociological Society, which views sociology as
. . . a specialized social science dealing
with the group, culture, personality, social
organization, social process, and social con-
trol, and deriving its data for study from
researches and special studies carried on by
sociologists and others.98
It is evident that disagreement continues to exist
through these definitions. This disagreement is spread
over a wide spectrum of terms. The largest areas of agree-
ment are over the subject matters of groups (six) and
society (four).
Conclusion
The most significant area of agreement, in the concep-
tions and definitions analyzed in this chapter, is that
sociology is a science. And, the most significant area of
disagreement is the subject matter of sociology. Even
though Comte, Spencer, Sumner, Ward, Giddings, Ross, and
Cooley are all concerned with social change, there are dis-
agreements about the fundamental assumptions underlying
this change. Moreover the five early European conceptions
and the six early American conceptions contain different
subject matters. Furthermore, out of twenty-three defini
tions examined, there are twelve different types of subject
matter. It seems as if the extent of disagreement over the
subject matter of sociology increases in proportion to the
number of sociologists surveyed.
98Wright and Elmer, General, p. 6.
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Briefly, then, from the time of Comte's use of the term
sociology until 1950, as seen in the different conceptions
and definitions contained in this chapter, there is a sig-
nificant amount of disagreement as to what the term socio-
logy means.
CHAPTER III
DEFINITIONS OF SOCIOLOGY IN
INTRODUCTORY TEXTS: 1951-19 70
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the extent
of agreement or disagreement on the definitions of sociology
between 1951 and 1970 inclusive. Introductory texts are
chosen as objects of this analysis because more than any
type of sociology texts, they are concerned with defining
the discipline. This is obvious since introductory socio-
logy is the major course in which general sociology is
taught in the United States.
The sample consists of sixteen introductory textbooks
which have more than one edition. The latest edition of
each book is used. Books having more than one edition are
used because of the evident wide use of such books. These
books are considered introductory texts because the authors
so specify either in the titles or in the prefaces of the
book.
This sample is drawn from the Cumulative Book Index
for the years 19E" through 1970 using only those books
published in the United States. It is thought that the
rationale for using introductory texts along with the
manner in which the sample is drawn, in addition to making
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the sample systematic, adds to the validity of this study,
making the results representative of the field of general
sociology in the United States for the years mentioned.
The definitions will be analyzed: 1. as to their
emphases on the scientific nature of sociology; and 2. as
to their view of the subject matter of sociology. In order
to obtain a better view of the definitions and their agree-
ment or disagreement both the definitions and portions of
the explanations of the definitions are used.
Bogardus
Sociology is
. . . [T]he study of ways in which social exper-
iences function in developing, maturing, and
repressing human beings through interpersonal
stimulation. Since these ways of making and re-
making the members of social groups tend to
appear in a given order they have been called
social processes, and sociology has been called
the study of social processes.
In this definition, there is no explicit reference to the
nature of sociology. Bogardus gives social processes as the
primary focus of sociology. This view is not new, it was
used by Ross and Cooley.
Roucek and Warren
Sociology is
. . . [T]he study of human beings in their
group relationships. As such it studies inter-
action within and between groups of people . . .
^mory Stephen Bogardus, Sociology (4th ed.; New York:
MacMillan Co., 1954), p. 5.
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Like any science, it attempts to describe its
subject matter and to point out such uniform-
ities as are found to exist.
Roucek and Warren believe that sociology is a science and
that description and formulation of uniformities are the
goals of this science. In this definition they view inter-
action between individuals as the subject matter of socio-
logy.
Sutherland, Woodward, and Maxwell
These sociologists ask the question "what is sociology?"
but they do not answer it in formal definition. Instead,
they say that sociology is one of the social sciences
which cannot be specified because "the boundary lines among
the social sciences have not been set up in any rigid fashion."
The emphasis of sociology can be found in the "general study
of human social behavior as it occurs in groups, large and
small . . . . No one of them [the social sciences] can be
3
embalmed in a definition."
Ogburn and Nimkoff
4
Sociology is "the scientific study of social life."
In discussing the scientific nature of sociology they point
2Joseph S. Roucek and Roland L. Warren, Sociology: An
Introduction (2nd ed.; Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams, and
Co., 1957), p. 3.
3Robert L. Sutherland, Julian L. Woodward, and Milton
A. Maxwell, Introductory Sociology (6th ed.; New York: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 9.
4William F. Ogburn and Meyer Nimkoff, Sociology (4th ed.;
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 22.
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out that "As a general science, sociology is also especially
fitted to deal with characteristics that are common to all
groups and societies."5 This emphasis on the science of
sociology is similar to that used by Sorokin in his defini-
tion, and it is the first definition in this chapter to
emphasize this characteristic of sociology. In explaining
the subject matter of sociology, Ogburn and Nimkoff make
the following statements:
Common to the various types of social life are
the interactions of individuals
Sociology . . . in studying social'life,
studies interactions . . . as social organiza-
tion.
Sociology explains social life ». . . in its widest meaning
by four factors; heredity, natural environment, culture,
and the group," with special emphasis on the latter two.6
Ogburn and Nimkoff present the most extensive explanation of
the subject matter thus far. They also present a different
category of subject matter. With the exception of Tonnies,
this is the first time the specific term social life has
been used as a subject matter within the confines of this
thesis .
Bell and Sirjamaki
They define sociology as "one of the sciences which
studies human behavior." In discussing the scientific
5Ibid., p. 25.
6Ibid., pp. 22, 23, 25, and 34.
^Earl H. Bell and John Sirjamaki, Social Foundations of
Human Behavior: Introduction to the Study of Sociology (2nd"
ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 4.
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nature of sociology, the authors do not differentiate it
from the other social sciences. They do say, however, that
sociology attempts to "forecast behavior."
With this knowledge we will . . . be able to
shape or modify behavior to the extent that
we can control the operation of the forces
involved because . . . human behavior is not
capricious. It is the product of orderly and
identifiable processes and forces 7°
Bell and Sirjamaki, therefore, present an applied sociology.
This is the first time in this chapter that sociology is
presented primarily as an applied social science. Comte
also wished to modify social behavior. Sumner, Ward,
Giddings, Ross, and Cooley, also wished sociology to have an
applied function. Bell and Sirjamaki, however, do not
attempt an explanation of the subject matter nor do they
attempt to differentiate the subject matter of sociology
from that of the other social sciences.
Chinoy
Chinoy presents a different view of the definition of
sociology than encountered previously:
We have thus far not defined sociology, other
than to identify it as a scientific study of
man and society. But this statement tells us
what sociology is about, not what it is or
how it differs from anthropology, psychology,
economics, political science, and history,
all of which also study man and society. To
offer a definition at this point in order to
isolate the essential ingredients in sociology
and to distinguish it from the other social
sciences would be of little value. We might
define sociology as the study of human groups,
8Ibid., pp. 4-5,
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of social relationships, of social institu-
tions . . . . But we should understand these
dei-initions only after we had explored the
meaning of the key terms or concepts . . . .
In so doing we should also necessarily intro-
duce still other terms whose meaning we should
then have to define. The first step toward
the understanding of sociology . . . is the
mastery of its basic concepts.9
In discussing the scientific nature of sociology, Chinoy
makes this statement:
The chief characteristic of both scientific
analysis and observation is.objectivity.
The validity of any conclusion and the relia-
bility of any observation are--or should be--
independent of the values and beliefs of the
scientist.
In making this value judgment Chinoy places his sociology
in the realm of pure science.
Broom and Selznick
These authors define sociology in the following manner:
"It explores the varieties of group structure and the ways
they affect political, psychological, and economic relation-
ships."11 The use of group structure as the subject matter
of sociology is similar to Comte's social statics and
Durkheim's social morphology.
9Ely Chinoy, Society: An Introduction to Sociology
(2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1967), p. 9.
1Orb_i_d. , p. E
i;LLeonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology: A Text
with Adapted Reading (4th ed.; New York: Harper and Row,
1968), p. 5.
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Cuber
Sociology is "a body of scientific l:rio-.-,-ledge about
human relationsjijip^," or "man's behavior in relation to
other men." In explaining the scientific nature of socio-
logy, Cuber says that sociological observations are scien-
tific and accurate and are based on what is, not what ought
to be. Here again, sociology is seen as a pure science.
Green
Sociology is
. . . [T]he synthesizing and generalizing
science of man in all his social relationships
. . . . The focus of attention upon social
relationships makes sociology a distinctive
field.13
In explaining the scientific nature of sociology he says
that
. . . [SJociology seeks to determine what large
classified numbers of people in a given society
do in their social relationships . . . to
explain why they behave in that fashion, and
finally to state the significance of that beha-
vior in terms of major social trends. Then,
generalization and synthesis are achieved.14
Green presents a pure social science and his focus is simi-
lar to that used by Pareto and Sorokin. He is emphasizing
the generalizing nature of sociology (i.e., the fact that
sociology looks for common characteristics of social
12John F. Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles
(New York: Appleton-Century^Crofts, 1968), p. 4.
13Arnold W Green, Sociology: An Analysis of Life in
Modem Society (5th ed. ; New YbTk: McGraw-Hill Book LoTT
1968), p7~I^
14Ibid., p. 7.
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phenomena). This is significant because it also shows that
Green's emphasis is similar to that of Ogburn and Nimkoff
even though they use different subject matter (social rela-
tionships and social life).
In explaining the subject matter of sociology, Green
points out:
For the most part, and in all social behavior,
man behaves toward conceptions, not things.
The intricate web of meaning is the basic stuff
of man in society . . . . Action within social
relationships is mainly guided by conscious
intent. This intent is to keep something,
gain something, or change something in terms
of the meaning attached to the given some-
thing . . . . The specific meanings and in-
tents of many people combine in action to pro-
duce events and trends that can be studied
independently of the individual meanings and
intents which made them up.15
B^th Wpihpr and Green sre concerned with the "web of moaning"
(Green) or subjective meaning (Weber).
Horton and Hunt
They define sociology "as the scientific study of social
life." In explaining the scientific nature of sociology
they quote Karl Pearson who says:
The unity of all science consists alone in
its method, not in its material. The man who
classifies facts of any kind whatever, who
sees their mutual relation and describes their
sequences; is applying the scientific method
and is a man of science.17
15ibid., pp. 2, 3, and 6.
16Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, Sociology (2nd ed.;
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 22.
l^Tbid PP- 23"24- T h e a u t h o r s ^ u o t s t h i s £ r o m
PearsonrWe^IElH^f-S^^ ( L o n d ° n : A* § C'
1900), p. 12.
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Again sociology is seen as a pure science.
In explaining the subject matter of sociology, Horton
and Hunt stress the study of various forms of social life
found in "customs . . . , institutions . . . , values."
Sociology concentrates its study upon man's group life and
the products of his group living . . . . Sociology is
interested in the way groups interact with one another and
in the processes and institutions they develop."18 As
Ogburn and Nimkoff, they attempt to fit varying types of
subject matter under one term: social life.
Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen
They define sociology as "the systematic formulation
and testing of theoretical generalizations about the forms,
processes; and consequences of the behavior of human beings
in relation to each other."
In discussing the scientific nature of sociology, Lund-
berg, Schrag, and Larsen are more explicit and their expla-
nation is more extensive than the others. Specifically,
two principles of science are given: the "principle of
empiricism" and the "principle of efficient causation."
The first is explained this way:
Observation is always, directly or indirectly,
the ultimate arbiter of issues in the search
I8Ibid., pp. 22, 23.
19George A. Lundberg, Clarence C. Schrag, and Otto N.
Larsen, Sociology (4th ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1968),
p. 14. '
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for basic knowledge . . . . This principle
means that a reported response to a phenomenon
is objective when all qualified persons who
observe the phenomenon agree with the report.
As for the principle of efficient causation, "Phenomena can
be explained only by discovering uniform relations between
them and antecedent or concomitant conditions."20 The
definition of Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen includes more
specific tasks for sociology to accomplish than the defi-
nitions of Pareto and Sorokin, even though all three use
the term "generalizing science" within their definitions.
Moreover, this is the first time that such tasks as "syste-
matic formulation and testing of theoretical generalizations"
have been mentioned within the confines of a definition.
Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen are also extensive in
their explanation of the subject matter of sociology as
evidenced by the following:
The basic premise is that the human being always
is born into a social group . . . . The person
and the group are to be understood in terms of
interaction . . . . Through interpersonal and
intergroup relations, social arrangements emerge,
become patterned, and may undergo change.
These arrangements extend in scope from family
structures to international political organiza-
tions. Sociologists are concerned with the pro-
perties of these social arrangements, including
positions, roles, norms, sanctions, values, and
goals . . . . In analyzing the interconnection
of such properties, sociologists study . . .
ways in whic^ persons and groups relate to each
other.21
id., PP- 11, 1 2
21Ibid., p. 8.
64
From the definition and the explanation it is evident that
the subject matter suggested by these authors is human beha-
vior or the way human beings behave in relation to each
other. Human behavior is an encompassing term used to
include the various properties of social arrangements dis-
cussed above.
Mack and Young
They define sociology as "the study of the social as-
pects of human life."22
In discussing the scientific nature of sociology,
Mack and Young make this statement: "It is a body of
knowledge, compiled by use of the scientific method, about
the structures of social life." This method consists of
the following steps:
(1) an observer gains knowledge through one
or more of his senses,
(2) he uses his reason to interpret his obser-
vations . . . and
(3) other persons sufficiently well trained in
the area being studied . . . reach the same
conclusions . . . then we have a scientific
fact arrived at by the scientific method.23
Mack and Young again present an extensive explanation of
the scientific nature of sociology, even though the defini-
tion itself is not so extensive. Their explanation agrees
with Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen's principle of objectivity
22Raymond W. Mack and Kimball Young, Sociology and
Social Life (4th ed.; New York: American Book Co., 1968),
p. 1.
23Ibid., pp. 1, 5.
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in that it is observed, interpreted, and presented to
colleagues for their consensus or dissensus before it is
accepted.
In explanation of the subject matter of sociology,
Mack and Young make this statement:
People everywhere deal with other human beings
as members of groups . . . . Every human being
is born into a group and spends his lifetime in
patterned social relations . . . . Social life--
the way in which groups are put together and the
way in which they function--is the subject
matter of sociology. 4
From this explanation it is evident that Mack and Young mean
social life when they say the social aspects of human life.
They are concerned specifically with how these groups are
put together and how they function, which is analogous to
social statics and social dynamics.
Merrill
According to Merrill, sociology is "the science of
group interaction."25 In discussing the scientific nature
of sociology he quotes Karl Pearson, as do Horton and Hunt.
This position again sees sociology as a pure science with
an emphasis upon method. In explaining the subject matter
of sociology, Merrill says:
Sociology studies man as a social [group]
animal . . . . [The groups of which man is a
member] produce customs and behavior patterns
that are handed down from generation to
24Ibid., p. 1.
25Francis E. Merrill, Society and Culture: An Intro
duction to Society (4th ed."TEn^Ii^d Cliffs, New Jersey
Prentice-Hall7Tnc\ > 1969), p. 9.
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generation by learning. Society is held to-
gether by these patterns . . . '. The rela-
tionships between human beings in groups are
determined by these elements; together they
constitute the social heritage . . . . In
the broadest sense, therefore, sociology is
the study of group interaction and the pro-
ducts of that interaction.26
Merrill's subject matter, group interaction, is the same as
that used by Roucek and Warren.
Rose and Rose
Rose and Rose define sociology as "the science that
studies how people interact and the effects of this inter-
action on human behavior."27 In discussing the scientific
nature of sociology, they say:
In four major respects--an objective attitude,
a set of methods for securing and analyzing
facts, a goal of seeking generalized conclu-
sions about cause-and-effeet relations, and
being value-free--sociology has set out to be
a science. In a fifth major respect, how-
ever, it as yet lacks one of the characteris-
tics of a developed science: it has not
achieved a coherent body of theoretical gen-
eralizations accumulated by previous socio-
logists into which all new research is inte-
grated.L0
Rose and Rose, therefore, view sociology as a pure science,
but as yet not fully developed.
After enumerating the various types of sociology's
subject matter, interaction, they make this statement:
26Ibid., p. 9.
27Arnold M Rose and Carolyn B. Rose, Sociology: The
Study of Human Rglations (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969), p. i~
28Ibid., P- 14.
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What processes lead to these interactions;
what exactly occurs when they take place,
and what are the short-run and the long-'
run consequences of them are the subjects
sociologists study . . . . Actually the
important and most distinctive thing about
human interaction most of the time is the
individuals involved are not representing
merely themselves and their thoughts but
rather the accumulated thoughts and ways of
behaving of their whole society back through
time . . . .*-*
The fact that people are seen as representatives of all of
the accumulated thoughts and behavior resembles what Simmel
said in describing the pure forms of interaction as "the
totality of social life which is and has been transmitted
throughout the life of man," and is similar to what
Merrill calls social heritage.
Bierstedt
At the conclusion of the first chapter in his text,
Bierstedt says, "One might contend, with some cogency, that
this entire chapter is in a sense an extended definition of
sociology." However, he thinks it is best to use a short
definition. He, therefore, adopts as his own a definition
contributed by P. A. Sorokin. To Sorokin, "Sociology is a
generalizing science of socio-cultural phenomena viewed in
their generic forms, types, and manifold interconnections."
Bierstedt goes on to say that:
This definition shares some of the imperfec-
tions of definitions in general. More particu-
larly it fails to distinguish between social
2 9 I b i d . , pp . 3, 4.
3 0 [ S i n u n e l ] , Socio3^jg}!_o£_Siininel, P- 21 .
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and cultural phenomena and groups them
together under the umbrella adjective [socio-
cultural]. It has the virtue nevertheless of
indicating in a brief sentence,, the formal aim
and purpose of the discipline.01
First of all, the last statement is not necessarily factual
as has been evidenced by this thesis thus far; there does
not seem to be any formal aim and purpose of this discipline.
Secondly, this is the first time in this analysis that an
author has used Sorokin's definition. Thirdly, Bierstedt's
definition is extensive in that it enumerates the scientific
nature of the field (a generalizing science); only Lundberg,
Schrag, and Larsen have done this before.
In explaining the scientific nature of sociology,
Bierstedt points out that sociology is "a social, a categori-
cal, a pure, an abstract, a generalizing, both a rational
and an empirical, and a general science." Science according
to him "is not a body of content but a method of approach to
any content." This method contains the principles of
"objectivity, relativism, ethical neutrality, parsimony,
skepticism, and humility."32 The extensive nature of
Bierstedt's explanation of the scientific nature of socio-
logy is similar to that of Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen.
In explanation of the subject matter of sociology,
Bierstedt states that it is concerned with
3lRobert Bierstedt, The Social Order (New York: McGraw
Hill Book Co!, 1970), pi W T i n n s - t i E e n from P. A. Sorokin,
Society, Culturg_1_aiid Personality, p. lb.
32Ibid., p. 15-
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. _ . . the nature of the groups to which indi
viduals belong and the nature of the societies
in which they live . . . sociology is interested
in the social forms and structures within which
this behavior takes place.53
Bierstedt's explanation of the subject matter is not as ex-
tensive as that of Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen. Bierstedt's
social structure (within which behavior takes place) is
similar to social statics as used by Comte and social mor-
phology as used by Durkheim.
Vander Zanden
Sociology is "the scientific study of human inter-
action." Sociology is a science because it is concerned
with the "disciplined pursuit of objectivity . . . as
objectively as is humanly possible." This is not an
extensive explanation, because it emphasizes only one as-
pect of the scientific nature of sociology. In his explana-
tion of the subject matter of sociology he states that
human interaction is "the mutual and reciprocal influencing
by two or more people of each other's feelings, attitudes,
and actions . . . . In brief, the unit of sociological in-
vestigation is the human group."
33Ibid., p. 9.
34James W. Vander Zanden, Sociology: A Systematic
Approach (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1970), p. i.
55Ibid., pp. 5, 8.
36Ibid., p. 8.
o
TABLE IV
AREAS OF SUBJECT MATTER IN DEFINITIONS: 1951-1970
Name
Bo^ardus
Roucck § Warren
Sutherland, Wood-
ward t] Maxwell
Off burn £-, Nimkoff
Bell ti Sir j amaki
Chinoy
Broom § Selznick
Cubcr
Green
Horton $ Hunt
Lund bergs Schrag
f, Lars en
Mack 'c, Young
Merrill
Bierstedt
Rose 'c\ Rose
Vander Zanden
TOTAL
Social
Inter-
action
X
X
X
X
4
Social
or human
Relation-
ships
X
X
2
Social
or human
life
X .
X
X
3
Social Social
or human Process-
Behavior es
X
X
X
X
3 1
Socio- Man §
Cultural society
Pheno-
mena
X
X
1 1
Group
Struc-
ture
X
1
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Summary of Findings
The first objective of the analysis, the examination
of the emphases concerning the scientific nature of socio-
logy, reveals that only one definition (Bogardus) does not
discuss the scientific nature of sociology, and only one
definition (Bell and Sirjamaki) states that sociology is an
applied science. Therefore, there is common agreement
among the definitions that sociology is a pure science.
There seems to be a tendency throughout the definitions for
some sort of explanation of what the term science means.
It is interesting to note that in comparing the opening
chapters of a sample of introductory texts in both the physi-
cal and social sciences (economics, political science, and
psychology), Kurtz and Maiolo found that sociologists rank
first in explanations of the "philosophy of science," while
the other fields were only briefly concerned or not con-
cerned at all. The authors conclude that in introductory
texts the purpose should be
. . . to indicate the nature of the disci-
pline in terms of its subject matter, rather
than to carry on a debate on the methodology
of the social sciences, or to present a dis-
cussion of the philosophy of science.
because this is seen as "an attempt to defend its (sociology's)
37
place in the worK of science."
37IHchard A Kurtz and John Maiolo, "Surgery for Socio-
logy The Need for Introductory Text Opening Chapterecto-
mifs,'" American_Sociologist, Vol. H I (February, 1968), pp.
40, 41.
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The definitions and explanations analyzed in this
chapter reveal that there is disagreement as to the subject
matter of sociology (see Table IV). Four sources (Roucek
and Warren, Merrill, Rose and Rose, and Vander Zanden) use
interaction as their subject matter. Two (Cuber and Green)
use social relationships. Three (Ogburn and Nimkoff, Horton
and Hunt, and Mack and Young) use social life, while three
(Sutherland, Woodward, and Maxwell, Bell and Sirjamaki, and
Lundberg, Schrag, and Larsen) mention human or social beha-
vior. Twelve of the sixteen definitions or 75 percent
mention one of these four. The other 25 percent are found
in the table as: processes (Bogardus), man and society
(Chinoy), group structure (Broom and Selznick) and socio-
cultural phenomena (Bierstedt). Another major area of agree-
ment concerning the general nature of the subject matter
might also be mentioned: encompassing subject matters, e.g.,
this is when one general term is used to include more
specific terms, of which each term might be used as the
subject matter. Five definitions contain this type of sub-
ject matter (Broom and Selznick, Bierstedt, Horton and Hunt,
Lundberg, Schrag and Larsen, and Ogburn and Nimkoff).
In conclusion, there is common agreement that sociology
is a pure science and disagreement as to the subject matter
of this science.
CHAPTER IV
A COMPARISON OF THE TWO EXISTING
STUDIES OF DEFINITIONS OF SOCIOLOGY
As far as this author can determine, there has been
only one published study on the definitions of sociology
since the inception of the term.1 This lack leaves a
research gap and shows that this is a neglected area of
sociological investigation. Assuming that the definition
of sociology is basic to the field and considering the dis-
agreement among sociologists concerning this definition
found thus far in this thesis, one is led to ask why there
has been only one study in this area. Whatever the reasons,
the purpose of this chapter is to compare Paul Hanly Fur-
fey 's study with the findings in Chapter III of the present
investigation to see if there is some continuity in dis-
agreement among sociologists as to what the term "sociology"
means. It is hoped that this chapter will present a syn-
thesis of the findings of both studies.
1Paul Hanly Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology
(New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1965), pp. 107
148.
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Furfey's Study
Furfey first published his study in 1948. Its purpose
was to "select a definition of sociology which will be con-
sidered final" by examining the trends of existing defini-
tions or "to ask how much agreement already exists regarding
the nature of sociology."^
Furfey describes his sample in the following manner:
All the definitions which turned up during two
or three years of intermittent search were copied.
Only formal definitions were collected; no effort
was made to interpret writers who did not commit
themselves explicitly. The definitions were all
taken from the works of recognized sociologists
or from standard general or technical dictionar-
ies . . . . The sample thus obtained was chosen
too casually to be adequate. The next step,'there-
fore, was to eliminate names from the groups that
appeared to be overrepresented until the balance
constituted a sample fairly well stratified by
country, date, and school of thought. At least
the 81 definitions in the final sample were
widely scattered in these three respects. It is
certainly not a scientifically designed sample,
but perhaps it may suffice to indicate general
trends.
Three books included in the sample were published before
1900, thirteen from 1900-1919, forty-two from 1920-1939,
and twenty in 1940 or thereafter. Three contained no
publication date. Of the total of eighty-one definitions
collected, thirty-nine came from the United States, ten
from France or Belgium, twelve from Germany or Austria,
nine from other European countries, and eleven from
2Ibid., pp. 138, 130.
3Ibid., pp. 130, 131.
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Hispanic America.4
In selecting a final definition of sociology, Furfey
says "it is important to keep in mind the rules for good
definition which logicians traditionally give."5
The principal rules are as follows: (1) The
definition must be coextensive with the thing
defined; it must apply to all that is denoted
by the defined term, and to nothing else . . . .
(2) The thing defined must not in any way,
directly or indirectly, be included in the
definition . . . . (3) The definition should
not be expressed in negative terms unless it
defines a negative concept . . . . (4) The
definition should be clear . . . . The type of
definition which best meets the requirements of
the above rules is definition per genus et
differentiam, definition by giving the imme-
which the thing defined belongsdiate class to
 o o_
and the specific difference which distinguishes
it from the other members of the class 6
Furfey then presents the principles for a definition of
science:
That which a science studies is called its
adequate object, its object of attribution,
or simply its object. This may be defined
more accurately as "that which is considered
for its own sake in some discipline and to
which are referred all the things which are
treated in that discipline." To define a science
it is merely necessary to define its adequate
object. This is done most appropriately, as
in the case of any definition, by stating a
generic element and a specific difference.
4Ibid., p. 131.
5Ibid., p. 121.
6Tbid D P 121-123. Furfey is using the following
sources"^'references: H. W. B. Joseph, An Introduction
to Logic (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), pp.
111-115.
 nn nA
Frobes, Logica formalis, pp.
Pesch, Inst' pp
, Vol. I, pp. 156-158.
108-111.
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These are furnished by the material object
and the formal object respectively. The
material obje^ is what a science studies,
considered in itself. The formal object
is the particular aspect under which" it is
studied by the science. The same material
objects may be common to many sciences.
Thus the human body is studied by anatomy,
physiology, histology, pathology, and other
disciplines. To define these sciences and
to distinguish them one from another it is
necessary to give their formal objects, the
particular aspects under which they res-
pectively consider their material. Sciences
receive their final specification from their
formal objects.
In order, then, "To define sociology it is only necessary to
choose a material and a formal object for the science."8
As far as the results of Furfey's study are concerned,
"the agreement is far from perfect." However, "study of the
sample shows enough agreement to indicate the nature of
sociology in a general way," but the "final" definition
must neither be too broad nor too narrow so in examining
the findings of his study he will use the "central tendency"
of the material and formal objects to formulate the final
definition.9 In terms of the material objects or "the sub-
ject matters"10 of the definitions analyzed, Furfey says
When one analyzes the sample of definitions to
discover the consensus regarding the material
object of sociology, the first impression is
rather discouraging. The majority of these
7Ibid., p. 123.
9Ibid., p. 132.
IQlbid., footnote, p. 9.
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writers use a special, personal phraeseology
and it seems hopeless to distinguish any agree-
ment among them. On further analysis, however,
certain broad categories stand out.
Categories of material objects are:
1. Society or the group 23
2. Interaction within the group 17
3. Social relationships or association 12
4. Social phenomena 11
5. Social facts ..'..'. 4
6. The material object was too vague
to put in one of these categories 7
7. No material object was given 9
Furfey points out that the above total of material
objects is eighty-three instead of eighty-one because two
definitions are used twice. He concludes that in formulating
the "final" definition of sociology, society is the "central
tendency" of the material objects. He also claims that none
of the definitions would disagree with "society in its struc-
tural and functional aspects" as the material object of
sociology.
In terms of the formal object or the "aspect under
which the material object is studied," the majority (forty-
seven of eighty-one) of the definitions contained none.
(This implies that these definitions specified sociology as
a science, only, and did not specify under what aspect this
science, studies the material object.) The remaining
thirty-four definitions containing a formal object reveal
"a definite central tendency" of one characteristic "which
sets it [sociology] off from the other social sciences."
Hlbid., pp. 134-136, 137.
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This formal object is "its effort to discover laws or
generalizations broad enough to apply to all, or at least
to many, of the areas of human association." The number of
definitions seen as agreeing with this were twenty-seven
(of the thirty-four).12
Furfey then concludes that the "central tendency" of
the majority of the definitions dictate that the "final"
definition be: "Sociology is the science which seeks the
broadest possible generalizations applicable to society in
its structural and functional aspects." He goes on to say
that
The assertion that this wording expresses the
trend of existing definitions is unavoidably
somewhat subjective. It is impossible to
demonstrate it absolutely, because personal
interpretation necessarily enters to some
extent. The present writer asserts with con-
fidence, however, that at least it does not
depart widely from the trend. This degree of
assurance suffices for the present purpose.x3
Comparison with the Present Analysis
Before comparing Furfey's findings with the findings
of the present analysis a comparison of the purposes and
procedures of each is in order. First of all, even though
both studies are in the same general area, Furfey's stated
purpose is to formulate a "final" definition of sociology
while this thesis is concerned only with the extent of
disagreement on the existing definitions. Because of this,
12ibid., pp. 137, 138.
13Ibid., p. 139.
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it is felt that the final results, of Furfey's study do not
lend themselves to comparison with the present study. On
the other hand, Furfey's preliminary results do compare
with the present analysis. Moreover, Furfey's procedure
differs from the procedure of Chapter III of the present
analysis in the following ways:
1. Furfey's sample was not limited by one or certain
nationalities but is supposed to include all coun-
tries of the world, however, it does not do this,
(e.g., countries of the Middle East, Africa, and
the Orient are omitted.) Hence, his findings may
not reflect all the countries that published books
in sociology before 1948 which might tend to con-
tradict or add more categories to his findings.
Chapter III, however, is limited to a sampling of
one country.
2. Furfey's sample includes a range of definitions
from over a fifty-year period, (before 1900 until
past 1940), while Chapter III is concerned only
with a twenty-year period.
3. Furfey used any book which contained a formal defi-
nition of sociology written by "recognized" socio-
logists representing all "schools of thought."
Neither of these criteria are explained nor are any
standards for making such judgments given. Chapter
III is confined to introductory text books which are
seen as representing general sociology (the area
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of the discipline most concerned with this defini
tion).
4. Furfey presents the findings of his study without
exposing the reader to actual analysis of the defi-
nitions so that the reader might better understand
Furfey's results. Chapter III of this thesis does
provide some analysis of the selected definitions.
5. While Furfey sees the formal object as the most
important aspect of the definition, the present
analysis emphasizes the material object or subject
matter. This is a basic disagreement between the
two studies. Furfey uses logical criteria for
formulating the "final" definition and applies
these criteria to the definitions he analyzed.
Chapter III, however, concludes with emphasis on
the subject matter because of the exploratory nature
of such a study. Furfey's concern with a logically
"correct," "final" definition tends to obscure the
actual extent of disagreement, which is the primary
concern of Chapter III.
The shortcomings of Furfey's study, then, are avoided
in Chapter III of this thesis. An advantage of this thesis
is_that it extends the findings of both-..studies- by-comparing-
them so that the agreement and disagreement reflected in
both may be synthesized to exhibit a wider range of defini-
tions over a longer period of time.
00
TABLE V
A COMPARISON OF THE SUBJECT MATTERS OF SOCIOLOGY:
FURFEY'S STUDY AND CHAPTER III OF THIS THESIS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Subject Matter
Society or Group
Social Relationships
Interaction
Social Phenomena
Social Life
Social Facts
Subiect Matter too Vague
No Subject Matter
Human or Social Behavior
Structure of Groups
Processes
TOTALS
Furfey's
Number (81)
23
12
17
11
4
7
9
83
Study
Percent
28.4
14.8
20.9
13.6
5.0
8.6
11.0
102.3*
Number
1
2
4
1
3
3
1
1
16
Chapter III
(16) Percent
6. 3
12. 5
25.0
6.3
18.8
18.8
6.3
6.3
100.3
*The percentages total over 100% as some authors use more than one subject matter.
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The findings of the two studies indicate that there is
a common agreement that sociology is a science. Moreover,
Furfey found that thirty-three of the eighty-one, or 40.7
percent, of the definitions have a formal object while the
present analysis (Chapter III) reports that two of the six-
teen definitions or 12.5 percent have a formal object.
Thus, there has been a sizable decrease in the use of for-
mal objects from 1951-1970.
Furfey's material object is the same as the subject
matter of sociology utilized" in Chapter III. Social rela-
tionships was used as the subject matter in 14.8 percent
and 12.5 percent of the definitions of the two studies,
respectively. Interaction was used as the subject matter
in 20.9 percent of the definitions in Furfey's study and
in 25.0 percent during the 1951 1970 study. Society or
group, however, was used less often during the second period,
1951-1970 (28.4 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively).
Furfey also found that 13.6 percent of the definitions he
examined dealt with social phenomena, whereas only one
definition in the present study (6.3 percent) contains a
similar emphasis. Five percent of Furfey's definitions
dealt with social facts; this is not found in the present
study. Finally, social life, human behavior, social process-
es, and the structure of groups were not found by Furfey in
his study but were found in Chapter III. It is evident,
then, that there have been changes both in the types of
subject matter and in the amount of usage of the same types
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of subject matter since Furfey's study.
In conclusion, a comparison of Chapter III (Defini
tions of Sociology in Introductory Texts: 1951-1970) with
Furfey's study reveals that through the periods studied,
there has been a common agreement that sociology is a science
while disagreement continues to exist as to the subject
matter of this science. In addition, in spite of the dis-
similarities between the two studies, in purpose and proce-
dure, the results are synthesized to add to the body of this
thesis further evidence about the disagreement among socio-
logists on the definition of sociology.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This thesis is an attempt to determine the extent of
agreement among sociologists on the definition of sociology.
The findings of this study indicate that there was, and
still is, disagreement concerning this definition. This
disagreement is evident in Chapter II, dealing with the
conceptions and definitions in Early European and Early
American sociology, and also in Chapter III, concerning such
definitions in American sociology through 1970. The synthe-
sis of Chapter III with Furfey's study (Chapter IV), pro-
vides evidence that this disagreement does not only exist in
the United States but in other countries as well. It should
be pointed out that throughout these chapters one finds an
agreement that sociology is a science but disagreement on
the subject matter of this science. A brief examination of
introductory text books published in 1971 shows that this
trend continues.
•'•The books examined were: Melvin L. De Fleur, William
V. D. Antonio, and Lois B. De Fleur, Sociology: Man in
Society (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company,
1971), p. 2.
Scott G. McNall, A Modern Introduction to Sociology:
The Sociological Experience (Boston": Little, Brown and Co. ,
1971), p. 195.
David Popenoe, Sociology (New York: Appleton Century
84
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Not only is there disagreement concerning the subject
matter of sociology during each period studied, but the pro-
portion of definitions which contain the same subject matter
changes from period to period. An illustration of this
variation, for Furfey's study and the present study (1921
1.950 and 1951-1970); is presented in Table VI. It is
apparent that four types of subject matter (group or society,
interaction, social relationships, and human behavior) are
the most frequently used throughout. However, there is a
variation among the periods studied on these four types of
subject matter. Approximately 28 percent of the definitions
in Furfey's study emphasized group or society as the subject
matter as compared to about 44 percent for the 1921-1950
period and around 6 percent during the 1951-1970 period.
The use of interaction fluctuated from 21 percent in Furfey's
study, to 13 percent (1921-1950), to 25 percent (1950-1970).
Social relationships was found in 14.8 percent of the defi
nitions in Furfey's study. This is compared to a small per-
centage (4.3) of the definitions during the 1921-1950 period
^continued) Crofts, 1971), p. 2.
Jerry Rose, Introduction to Sociology (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1971), p. 3.
Society Today (Del Mar, California: C. R. M. Books,
1971), p. 6.
Jackson Toby, Contemporary Society: An Introduction to
Sociology (2nd ed.; New York: John Wiley $ Sons, Inc., 1971),
p. 5 .
Everett K. Wilson, Sociology: Rules, Roles, and Rela-
tionships (Homewoo'd, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1971), p. 7.
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TABLE VI
THE VARIATION OF SUBJECT MATTERS
OF DEFINITIONS: FURFEY'S STUDY,
1921-1950, AND 1951 1970 (In Percentages)
SUBJECT MATTER Furfey'
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Group or Society
Interaction
Social Relationships
Human Behavior
Social Processes
Man § His Environment
Human Association
Human Experience
s Study
28.4
20.9
14.8
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
1921-1950
43.6
13.1
4.3
8. 7
4.3
8.7
8.7
4.3
1951-1970
6.3
25.0
12.5
18.8
6.3
00.0
00.0
00.0
9. Group, Culture, Per-
sonality, Social
Organization, Social
Processes, Social
10.
11.
17.
1 3
14.
15.
Control
Social Phenomena
Social Life
Social Facts
Structure of Groups
Subject Matter
too vague
No Subject Matter
Given
00.0
13.6
00.0
5.0
00.0
8.6
11.0
4.3
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00.0
00
6
18
00
6
00
00
.0
.3
.8
.0
.3
.0
.0
T0TAL 102.3* 100.0 100.3
*Some authors used more than one subject matter.
87
and 12.5 percent during the 1951-1&70 period. Finally,
human behavior was not found in any of the definitions in
Furfey's study, while it comprised almost 9 percent in 1921-
1950 and almost 19 percent during the 1951-1970 period.
Qne of" the most important areas of agreement in this
thesis was found in the Early European and Early American
conceptions a£" sociology in. Chapter II. Some of these con-
ceptions" contained" a concern for social change and at the
same.time mentioned sociology as an applied or utilitarian
science. Comte conceived sociology as the study of social
evolution with sociologists as the priests of the positi-
vistic society.. Sumner, Giddings, and Ward's conception
was similar in. that social evolution was also the subject
matter and sociology was viewed as sort of a "philosophy of
Life" that would, direct this evolution. Ross and Cooley
both wished to focus on the social processes which are
endemic to social change as the subject matter of sociology.
Ross also wanted sociologists to plan the policy of society,
and Cera ley wanted sociology to aid in social improvement.
The definitions examined from 1921-1970 and in Furfey's
study, however, contained little or no mention of social
change and utilitarian sociology. In his study, Furfey did
not find definitions mentioning either social change or
sociology as a utilitarian science. During the 1921-1950
period only one definition (Reuter and Hart) mentioned the
social processes; of social change as the subject matter of
sociology, and only three definitions (Hays, Bernard, and
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Binder) indicated that sociology is an applied science.
Finally, only one definition (Bell and Sirjamaki) during
1951 1970 mentioned sociology as an applied science. It is
possible that the Early European and Early American socio-
logists might have been dissatisfied with their societies
which might have led them to conceive sociology as an
applied science studying social change.2 Thus, it might be
postulated that an emphasis on social change (in relation
to the subject matter of sociology) is endemic to a concern
for sociology as an applied science. Only future studies,
however, can validate this observation.
It is this author's opinion that the examination of the
definitions of sociology is useful because it seems to
indicate that little consensus has been reached among socio-
logists on the basic concerns of the discipline. The dif-
ferent terms used by the authors of the texts suggest dif-
ferent emphases of the social world, e.g., individual inter-
action as opposed to the structures and functions of society,
The findings of the study also indicate that an awareness of
the basic definition of the field must first develop before
a synthesis of the many definitions can occur.
2The -brief examination of introductory text books p u b -
lished in 1971 reveals that there is a renewed interest in
sociology as an applied science and social change as the
subject matter of this science because such a concern is
referred to in all seven books. This focus, however, is
not used in any of the definitions themselves.
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